Along with house rents, wages have frequently been described as the ttstickiestu prices in the economy, rarely adjusted more than once a year.
Introduction
Theoretical models accounting for variations in the rate of wage or price inflation rarely take explicit account of the costs of altering money wages or prices1 and yet these models are often evaluated in terms of their correspondence with data that presumably reflect the existence of such costs. At least until the more inflationary experiences of the 1970's, the normal situation in British and American manufacturing industry was for wage rates to be adjusted no more frequently than once a year even when there were indications of substantial inflationary pressures. The recognition of this point has induced economists to incorporate in some fashion the varying time pattern of wage settlements into their fitted models of wage inflation, but all have taken this pattern as exogenously determined.2 By contrast, this paper considers the determinants of the probability of a new wage settlement in addition to the determinants of the size of the wage change conditional upon a new settlement taking place. This distinction between the occurrence of an event and the extent of the occurrence has been investigated in the *1 am indebted to Tom MaCurdy, Brian McCormick, Christopher Pissarides, Craig Riddell, Peter Saunders, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. I am also grateful to Michael Lohrer for his excellent research assistance. Work on this paper was supported by a grant from the Sloan Foundation to the Department of Economics at Stanford University.
-2-literature on the demand for durable goods (e.g., Cragg [1971] ), on labor force participation and hours of work (e.g., Heckinan [1974] ) and on the choice of transport modes (e.g., Domencich and McFadden [1979] ), but with few exceptions it has been neglected in empirical work on wage inflation.3
Yet the distinction Is an important one with immediate relevance to the evaluation of the effects of incomes policies on the course of wage inflation. The typical procedure in this literature is to regress some aggregate index of wage changes on dummy variables that indicate the presence or absence of incomes policies. But this procedure does not make full use of information about the form of these incomes policies. That is, incomes policies have sometimes taken the form of specifying a permissible ceiling on wage increases in which case they are designed to affect the extent of occurrence of the event, but not the occurrence of the event. On other occasions, incomes policies have operated by postponing the implementation of new wage settlements in which case they are directed towards the occurrence of the event. One purpose of this paper is to reevaluate the effectiveness of incomes policies by making use of information both on the frequency of wage settlements and on the size of wage changes when a settlement takes place.
Where the time pattern of wage settlements differs across sectors of the economy and where no account is taken of this non-synchronous pattern, then aggregate quarterly wage change equations will be plagued with aggregation bias. That is, under these circumstances, the coefficients of these aggregate wage change equations should not be expected to display any stability with respect to the addition or deletion -3-of observations. This is by no means a novel point4 yet its Implications appear not to have been fully realized because the unproductive search for plausible and stable aggregate wage change equations continues unabated.
A more appropriate strategy is to investigate the determinants of wage settlements and wage changes in individual sectors of the economy and this paper illustrates this strategy for the British coal industry. The task of extending the analysis to other industries will be addressed on another occasi on.
II.

Conceptual Framework
Collective bargaining agreements in the British industrial relations system are not legally binding contracts so that, unlike the unionized sector in the United States, the interval between wage settlements is not predetermined by the most receftt agreement. On the contrary, negotiations toward a new wage settlement may be initiated in any quarter. If there were no costs to negotiating and implementing new wage agreements, then a new wage settlement would occur whenever the determinants of wage changes called for a new wage level. In fact, it has been argued that the transactions costs of negotiating and executing a new wage contract are by no means negligible nor should such costs be assumed to be unchanged over time. These costs include the prior determination by each party of the bargaining posture to be adopted, the resources consumed in conducting negotiations between the two parties, the expenses borne by each party in the event of a strike, and the administrative costs of -4-changing payroll records. Rees' [1970] statement of the nature of these transactions costs in the labor market is particularly compelling:
"Except in hyper-inflations, employers generally seem to behave as though the costs of changing wages were very substantial. When faced with labor shortages, they frequently lower hiring standards, raise expenditures on recruitment, and contract-out work before raising wages.... [E] very change in wages tends to raise questions of internal equity that can be very troublesome to solve. Even if it is decided to raise all wages uniformly, it must be decided whether this is to be by a uniform percentage or a uniform amount, and whether the increase is to extend all the way up the structure of wages and salaries or only part way. The problems are not unlike those faced by the United States Congress in separating problems of the level of income tax from issues of tax reform. Although we know very little about the exact nature of the costs of making wagechanges, we can infer that they exist. Wages are, next to house rents, the stickiest general class of prices in the economy, seldom adjusted more frequently than once a year. This stickiness may be reinforced by unionism and collective bargaining, but it was present long before unions arrived" (p. 234).
In fact, during the period from the first quarter of 1948 (1948 I) to the last quarter of 1975 quarter of (1975 , the coal miners' nationally negotiated wage rates were changed in only 24 of the 112 quarters. Wage rates were not changed each year: five years witnessed no change in wage rates (in 1948, 1949, 1952, 1959, and 1972) and there was an occasion on which wages were adjusted in successive quarters and another occasion on which eleven quarters separated wage changes. Even during the inflationary 's (until 1975 , wage rates in coal mining were renegotiated on only five occasions. A stylized representation of the situation is given in Figure 1 where the vertical axis measures the proportionate change in wage rates (Aw) and where X on the is less in the south-west quadrant of the graph than in the north-east quadrant. The distinction between these two hypotheses in the literature on "downward wage rigidity" is rarely made, let alone tested.
The presence of these transactions costs calls for statistical methods that discriminate between (i) the effects of a variable on the probability that wages will change and (ii) conditional on wages changing, the effects of that same variable on the magnitude of the wage change. It is not appropriate to measure these second effects by applying conventional least-squares to the nonzero observations on tw since, in this circumstance, the composition of the sample is being chosen on the basis of the values of the left-hand variable (that is, observations with zero values for w are being discarded) so that the conditional expectation of the error term is not zero. Nor is it appropriate to pool the limit (i.e., w = 0) observations with the nonlimit (i.e., w 0) observations and estimate a least-squares regression over the entire sample. The gist of the bias that results in this event is illustrated by Figure 2 where the crosses indicate the observations describing the "true"
relationship between an exogenous variable X and Aw and where the dashed line is the (biased) least-squares relationship estimated over all observations.6 Thus, consider the familiar situation in which in an attempt to reduce inflation the government appeals to the parties involved in collective bargaining to display "restraint" in their wage negotiations.
A frequent research procedure to evaluate the effects of this policy of 
Empirical Results
This section reports an analysis of the determinants of the frequency of wage changes and of the magnitude of wage changes in the British coal industry from 1948 to 1975. The wage series used in the empirical analysis is that determined by the national agreements between the National Coal Board and the National Union of Mineworkers and it covers all manual workers in the coal mining industry. As is well known, the actual earnings of coal miners differed from these nationally negotiated rates, particularly so for piece-rate workers. Nevertheless, for most workers in this industry, the largest changes in the level of The probit equation estimated to determine the conditional probability of a wage change taking place in the coal industry is as follows:
where precise definitions of the variables are given in Table 1 and where N denotes the standard cumulative normal distribution function. This equation contains the variables most often used to account for wage changes at the aggregate level (namely, the percentage change in retail prices (tpt), the unemployment rate (1) and the incomes policy variables (the It's)) and it has been augmented with two industry- to measure the effects of incomes policies is customary and it is also customary to lament the inadequacies of the procedure. This conventional practice is modified here by the use of three dichotomous variables that distinguish the effects of different forms of incomes policies: the variable I identifies quarters when a wage "freeze" was in effect and ostensibly all wage increases were prohibited; the variable 12 identifies quarters when a "twelve month rule" was instituted under which the time between wage settlements was mandated to be no less than one year; and the variable 13 identifies quarters when wage ceilings were in -12-effect, that Is, quarters when the government declared wage increases to be no greater than a certain specified level. If the wage freeze achieves its stated purpose, then I will reduce the probability of wages changing, while will operate in a similar fashion unless the period between wage negotiations would have been no less than twelve months in the absence of this incomes policy. A policy of imposing ceilings on wage increases is designed to affect the magnitude of the wage change and not the frequency of wage settlements.
The appendix to Fallick and Elliott [1981] Estimates of the probit index parameters of equation (1) are given in column (1) of Table 2 with estimated partial derivatives of the probability of wage change function evaluated at sample means given in column (jl).12 Thus the greater the Increase in retail prices (hp) -13-since the previous wage settlement, th higher the probability of wages changing in the current quarter. In particular, at sample means, a small increase in p above its average value raises the probability of a new wage agreement by 6.6% and this estimate is highly significant by conventional criteria. Increases in labor productivity raise the probability of a new wage settlement although this effect would not be judged as significantly greater than zero by the usual standards. By these same criteria, no significant association exists between movements in coal prices and in the frequency of wage settlements. On a conventional likelihood ratio test, the hypothesis that the probability of a wage increase is independent of movements in unemployment (that is, a joint test of a4 and cannot be rejected at conventional levels of significance. Other things equal, seasonal variations in wage settlements appear to be of negligable importance. Of the three incomes policy dummy variables only the coefficient on that pertaining to the wage freeze, I, appears to be significantly less than zero: the results suggest that, at the mean values of the variables, the imposition of a wage freeze reduces the probability of a wage settlement in coal mining by almost 24%.
A number of variations on this equation specification yielded results that differed in no substantive sense from those reported in column (i) of Table 2 . For instance, instrumental variables were found for the rate of change of coal prices,14 but treating Ac as endogenous in this way did not materially affect the results. The same was true when the unemployment rate was measured as an average over four quarters instead of its one-quarter value used in the estimates in column (i). -15-Some researchers (e.g., Henry [1981] ) have allowed for the possibility of an acceleration in the rate of wage inflation in the period following the relaxation of an incomes policy and this "catch-up" feature was investigated in these data by constructing dummy variables for those periods when an incomes policy was dropped and was not replaced by another form of incomes policy. In fact, the probability of a wage settlement exhibited no significant association with this "catch-up" variable.
Finally, equation (1) was modified to allow for a different classification of incomes policies, a classification that turns on whether the incomes policies have been "voluntary" on the one hand or "statutory"
(or "compulsory") on the other hand. The dichotomous variable '4t takes the value of unity in those quarters in which a "voluntary" incomes policy was in operation and of zero otherwise while the variable takes the value of unity in those quarters in which a "statutory" or "compulsory" incomes policy was in effect and of zero otherwise. The categorization of incomes policies into these two forms follows Parkin and Sumner ([1978] + IE]7jSIt + i188i1it
where Mt is the inverse of the Mills' ratio formed from the probit estimates in column (i) of Table 2 , where Ct is a stochastic disturbance term, and where the other variables are defined in Table 1 . The estimates of equation (2) are contained in column (i) of Table 3 and it is evident that, with so few degrees of freedom, little can be said with confidence Notes: The standard error of the regression is given by a. Table 3 which omit the Mills' ratio variable, M. The point estimates change noticeably although, once again, the standard errors accompanying these coefficients do not permit confident inferences. Columns (iii) and (iv) of Table 3 replace the three incomes policy dummy variables I, 12, and 13 with 14 (denoting a "voluntary" incomes policy) and 15 (denoting a "statutory" or "compulsory" incomes policy). The Mills' ratio variable, M, in column (iii) is formed from the probit estimates in column (iv) of Table 2 . Once again, it is difficult to derive confident inferences although on a conventional t-test the coefficient on the statutory incomes policy variable, 15, does appear to be significantly less than zero. Even if variables such as the seasonal dummy variables, coal price changes, and productivity changes are arbitrarily excluded from these least-squares equations or if coal price changes are treated as an endogenous variable, the resulting parameter estimates on the remaining variables do not differ appreciably from those given in Table 3 . Surely these results must be interpreted as being very discouraging with respect to our knowledge of the determinants of the magnitude of wage changes in the coal industry.
-19-IV.
Conclusions
Since wage settlements appears to be affected more by a voluntary incomes policy while the magnitude of wage changes seems to be responsive to a statutory incomes policy.
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Footnotes
Among the rare exceptions are Barro [1972] and Sheshinski and Weiss [1977] .
2 For instance, Rowley and Wilton [1973] address the temporal aggregation problem when an equal number of settlements each period are assumed to take place. Or Ashenfelter and Pencavel [1975] and Smith and Wilton [1978] augment conventional equations of quarterly wage inflation with a variable measuring the fraction of workers receiving new wage settlements.
3 The main exceptions include work by Coutts, Tarling, and Wilkinson [1976] and Elliott and Dean [1978] .
It is recognized in Dicks-Miréaux and Dow's [1959] seminal paper and in Black and Kelejian [1972] . Evidence on aggregation bias s contained in Rowley and Wilton [1974] . Work with individual contract data is presented in Christofides, Swindinsky, and Wilton [1980] , Hamermesh [1970] , and Riddell [1979] .
5 This second specification is Rosett's [1959] model of friction.
6 In fact, in the British coal mining industry, from 1948 to 1975 nationally negotiated wage rates never fell so all the nonlimit observations on w were positive values.
For instance, Parkin [1978] finds "no evidence at all either from the studies of the determinants of inflation or from more direct studies that wage and price controls materially affect the rate of inflation" (p. 49) while Henry [1981] claims, "Here the outstanding feature is the significant effects for incomes policy generally observed, whatever the basic model of inflation used" (p. 42, emphasis in original). Blackaby's [1978] survey of incomes policy concludes, "In sum, if we suppose that over this period there was a variety of forces tending to produce a rising., trend in the increase in money earnings, then the experience of the late 1960's and early 1970's is consonant with the view that the two incomes policies during that period were successful, so long as they were in force, in holding back this process" (p. 392).
8 Thus, if Q is the predicted value of the index from a fitted probit on the determinants of a wage change taking place and if N is jhe standard cumulative normal distribution function, then Mt = N'(Qt)/N(Qt).
See Heckman [1979] for further details.
The adjustment of wage rates by decisions reached at the national agreements was clearly prompted in the 1950's by movements in pay differentials between time-rate workers and piece-rate workers.
-22-However, a continuous, quarterly, series on the earnings of these two types of workers is not available. More information on industrial relations in the coal industry is contained in McCormick [1979] .
The national unemployment rate was used in these equations in preference to unemployment in the coal industry for several reasons. First, voluntary separations from the industry were "considerably affected by fluctuations in the general level of demand for labor" (McCormick [1979] . p. 106) which is often indexed by the aggregate unemployment rate. Second, when a contraction in the coal industry's labor force was required after 1957, this was accomplished primarily through early retirements and through quits for other jobs and these individuals frequently escaped registration as unemployed. Third, it is by no means clear how to interpret movements in an industry's unemployment rate when labor supply curves to an industry are highly elastic.
12 The effect of a variable X on the probability is derived by multiplying the coefficient of the index, Q, by the normal density N'(Q) at the evaluation point; that is, prob./3X = (dN/dQ)(aQ/u) = N'(Q)(Q/aX). At the sample mean values of the variables, the standard normal density is .228 for the estimates in column (1). As is evident from a comparison of the entries in column (ii) with those in column (iii), the ordinary least-squares estimates and the probit estimates of equation (1) imply very similar partial derivatives of the probability of wage change function. 13 In other estimates, the incomes policy dumr' variable I was interacted with Ap, x, U, D,and (U.D) to test the hypothesis that the whole relationship between the probability of wages changing and these variables alters when a "wage freeze" is in effect. A conventional likelihood ratio test fails to reject the null hypothesis.
14 The instrumental variables consisted of the percentage change in the price of gas and electricity, the percentage change in the price of construction inputs, and the percentage change in an index of consumer total expenditure. The source for these three variables in the Monthly Digest of Statistics.
